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Abstract 
The traditional view on price dynamics tends to concentrate on the autore-
gressive properties of price itself, ignoring the interaction between the rental 
market and the housing market. In addition, the search frictions in the housing 
market are discussed limitedly in literature. This paper therefore documents 
the empirical facts on the housing and rent markets , and then proposes a com-
petitive search framework to analyze and explain the interactions on rent price 
ratio and vacancy ratio both in the long run and short run. Our results indi-
cates that when the price increases, the vacancy rate in the housing market 
would decrease, meanwhile the vacancy rate in the rent market would increase. 
However, when the rent increases , the vacancy rate in the rental market would 
decrease and that in the housing market would increase. Our analysis provides 
alternative, tractable methods on the search theory dynamics by using short-
run equilibria approximating the transition path. In the end, we also discuss 
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The housing market is important in terms of its size and volume in transac-
tions. At the micro level, housing component stands for a very large share on 
household portfolio position. The 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
reports that about two-thirds of U.S. households own their primary residences, 
and home value accounts for 55% of a homeowner's total assets, on the average. 
At the macro level, according to the "National Association of Home Builders" 1 
, housing contributes to GDP in two basic ways with approximately 10% of 
the total GDP, through private residential investment, such as construction, 
and through consumption spending on housing services, such as rent. However, 
most of the focus on the housing market has been on price. In Shiller's book 
Irrational Exuberance, he documents the historical housing price variation and 
other related price data, which we illustrate in Figure 1.1. 
It is obvious that the housing price fluctuation can be explained partly by 
the variables listed in the figure. In the early years, housing price is associated 
with construction prices, and in the later stages, interest rates seem to be more 
relevant to the prices. However , conventional wisdom only emphasizes the price 
properties on housing, ignoring the obvious substitute, rental housing. From 
investment point of view, rent rate tends to behave as a dividend of housing 
price, by acting as a fundamental. Hence, people have paid attention to rent 
1 For detailed housing shares, please consult the NAHB Web site http:/ jwww.nahb.org. 
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Figure 1.1: U.S. Home Prices, Building Costs, Population, and Interest Rates 
price ratio recently. 
The recent decline in the rent-price ratio has attracted much attentions due 
to the market crash. However, retrospectively, there is always an interaction 
between the rental and housing markets. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to in-
vestigate the fundamental relationship in the rent price ratio. However , unlike 
centralized market, housing markets have decentralized trading patterns. Peo-
ple in markets need to locate the proper counter party to trade with. Despite 
the existence of mediating agencies, the facts still fit the search framework. 
Therefore, the disequilibrium nature of the housing market attracts attention 
for housing market dynamics in a non-walrasian style in order to incorporate 
equilibrium vacancy in the model. 
However, the demand side in the market is not facing the only option to 
purchase the housing unit; rather it could make a tenure choice with respect 
to its own constraints. Thus, the parallel rent markets are worth comparing 
to the housing market. The so-called tenure choice problem in the housing 
market has long been investigated at the micro level, theoretically and empiri-
cally. However, at the macro level, there is still no established linkage between 
theory and data. Since these two markets, the housing and rental markets, 
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are in nature the same, we model these markets using a competitive search 
framework. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides detailed review of 
stylized facts and the literature. Section 2 discusses the baseline model. Then 
we discuss the model properties in the long run in Section 3 and in the short 
run in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the dynamics of the model. We 
discuss possible extensions for the model in Section 6. Finally we make our 
con cl us ions in Section 7. 
1.1 Stylized Facts 
In addition to the figure from Shiller (2006), we provide a statistical and graph-
ical summary of the housing and rental markets. The data we adopted are 
mainly from the 'Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS) ' survey 
for vacancy rates , while the price data are from Shiller and Davis 's Web sites. 
Figure 1.2 illustrate the market size of the housing and rental markets. The 
markets are segmented in nature, as the data report units exclusively for sale 
and for rent. 
: : ~~ r----------------------, ] 11 
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Figure 1.2: Housing and Rental Markets, Size 
We define the market size of the housing market by the housing units for 
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sale times the median asking price. Similarly, we also obtain the market size 
of the rental market by multiplying the median rental rate with the total rent 
units from the first month in 1988. The rent market size is approximately 
one tenth of the housing market. The volume is large and cannot be ignored. 
However, it is also evident that the recent market crash drove down the market 
size of both the rental and housing markets. In addition, we present the housing 
units for sale and for rent in figure 1.3. The units for rent are about two and 
three times larger than those for sale. In sum, the rent market is substantially 
large to offer enough housing units for demand side agents to make their choice, 
the " tenure choice" decision. 
0.5 -
Unit~ in Million 
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Figure 1.3: Units for Sale and Rent 
Moreover, we could observe the disequilibrium nature of the housing mar-
ket. There is the co-existence of vacant housing units and people search for 
housing units. The housing market vacancy rates are about 1%, whereas the 
rental market vacancy rate is much more fluctuated. In Figure 1.4, we illus-
trate the time series of the vacancy rates and the rent price ratio. The Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) price line is made according 
to price provided by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and 
the CSW is Cass-Shiller-Weiss data. The rent price is from Morris Davis ' Web 
site. The rent price ratio seems to have a positive relationship with rent vacan-
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Figure 1.4: Vacancy Rates and the Rent Price Ratio 
cies and a negative relationship with housing vacancy rates. However , there is 
no valid theoretical examination of such relationship, which should take into 
account two related but segmented markets and employ a non-walrasian model 
to obtain the vacant housing units in the supply side. 
1.2 Literature Review 
This paper provides links to two streams of literature: the search models and 
the housing rental market interactions in the real estate market. 
The search and matching approach is frequently applied in the labor and 
monetary literature2 . The seminal paper by Wheaton (1990) is the first to 
introduce search model in the housing market. In his paper , he proposed a 
decentralized exchange model with search frictions to address price dispersion 
and time on the market, with a fixed population without entry and exit, only 
status (match and mismatch) switch. After his paper, there have been many 
works3 in this stream which apply the search theory in housing market , or 
more generally, to analyze the durable goods market, such as that of Inderst & 
Muller (2002). Even more generally taking into consideration the investment 
2For a detailed review, please refer to Rogerson et al. (2005) 
3such as Read (1991) and Van der Vlist et al. (2002) and others. 
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good nature of housing units, works like that of Krainer & LeRoy (2002) use 
the search theory to analyze the asset markets and link the liquidity effect 
by the search friction. Although the search approach in the housing market is 
not scarce in the literature, few papers discuss the parallel rental market, and 
the interactions between housing and rental markets are largely ignored. Read 
(1993) applied the search theory in the rental market only. Thus, few works 
look theoretically through the lens of search at the rental and housing market. 
Given our interest in the interactions between the rental and housing mar-
kets, the model proposed by Moen (1997) is therefore suitable for our analysis. 
In his paper, he constructed a general equilibrium model for markets with 
search frictions, in which all agents maximize their utility subject to parame-
ters, which provide us the fundamental theoretical framework to analyze the 
interactions between the housing and rental markets. 
There are many studies that examine segmentation in housing markets. 
However, conventional papers would focus more on geographical and racial, 
and other social factors in segmentations. For example, Goodman & Thibodeau 
(1998) discussed the geographical segmentation in housing markets. In this 
paper, we restrict our attention to the rental and housing markets, and model 
them as perfectly segmented in terms of the search process. The tenure choice 
problem is intensively studied, which allows housing buyers to buy or rent the 
housing unit, so it would be reasonable to assume the segmentation nature 
of the housing and rental markets. According to the 'Housing Vacancies and 
Homeownership Survey(CPS/HVS)' from U.S. Census Bureau, we could obtain 
a full time series on the housing supply in the rental and housing markets, 
which allow us to bring the model to the data structurally. 
Another approach analyzes the rent-price ratio empirically, which also sheds 
lights in the analysis of the interaction between the housing and rental mar-
kets. Early works such as that of Chen (1996) discussed the price-rent ratio in 
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China. Recently, in the finance literature, Pakos (2005) investigates the pre-
diction ability of the rent-price ratio to forecast Fama-French portfolios , which 
is similar to the work of Piazzesi et al. (2007). However , Campbell et al. (2006) 
and Davis et al. (2008) constructed and documented the rent price ratio vari-
ation, decomposed it to several factors , and examined its relationship with 
other macro variables , while Kim (2008) extended this analysis to the regional 
level. However, all of these approaches ignore the disequilibrium nature of the 
housing and rental market. 
Perhaps the closest paper related to this one is that of Leung & Zhang 
(2007). Their paper discussed the housing market with competitive search 
framework, applying to both the high-end and low-end housing markets, and 
obtained equilibrium price dispersion and time-on-the market theoretically. 
However , with the availability of data, our model allows empirically justifi-
cation of our theoretical prediction. Parallel to our approach, several papers 
developed search models for discussion in the housing market, notably, those 
of Berkovec & Goodman (1996), Krainer (2001), Novy-Marx (2009) , Peterson 
(2009) , Ngai & Tenreyro (2008), and Diaz & Jerez (2008). However , most of 
these papers do not discuss the interaction between the rental and housing 
markets. Furthermore, among these, only Peterson (2009), Ngai & Tenreyro 
(2008) , and Diaz & Jerez (2008) examined the empirical predictions of the 
1nodel with the data, which is similar to our model. 
In sum, our model adopts the competitive framework to analyze the inter-
actions between the rental and housing markets , and we could bring our model 
to the data to verify our predictions. We will fully discuss our model setup in 
the next section. 
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1.3 Model Framework 
We model the rent housing market in a competitive search framework, obtain 
the long-run and short-run search equilibrium, and also provide the transition 
dynamics between the equilibria. The flow-chart below illustrates the model 
framework . 
Sellers' Inflow 
Exit the Market 
Figure 1.5: Flow Chart of the Competitive Search Model 
The housing market has an inflow of sellers, buyers and lessees. Since we 
assume a perfect segmentation between the housing and rental markets, sell-
ers need to choose which submarket to enter. After this decision, the sellers 
begin matching with buyers in the housing markets and with lessees in the 
rental market. After this match, in the housing market, a pair of buyer and 
seller will bargain for the transaction price and make the deal, then exit the 
market; in the rental market, a pair of lessee and lessor (former seller) will 
bargain over the rental rate and form the rental contract. This rental contract 
is subject to a separation shock; when hit by such shock, the landlord and 
tenant will terminate the rental contract and go back to the unmatched status 
to search for a new trading partner. Such settings are parallel to the reality 
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of the housing and rental markets. Since we do not incorporate tenure choice 
in this paper, we simply adopt the simplest discrete heterogeneity in buyers. 
Under this circumstance, sellers observe the heterogeneity in the demand side 
and choose the market to enter since we also abstract the time lag due to 
construction and other issues. The sellers almost make instantaneous choices 
upon arriving in the market. With this setting, we also forbid the possibilities 
of "on-the-job-search" to be applied in the housing market, which also affect 
the vacancy rates and trading frictions, in addition to the asset valuations. We 
leave these to the model extensions for detailed discussions. 
We assume that in the long run, there is a free entry for sellers; thus, based 
on this assumption, we could obtain the long-run search equilibrium. In addi-
tion we also define the short-run search equilibrium through the assumption 
that in the short run, there is no entry for sellers, who need to decide which 
submarket to enter based on the free flow assumption between submarkets. 
Then we discuss the approximation of dynamics between long-run search equi-
libria using short-run equilibria. 
Chapter 2 
The Model 
Our model belongs to the class of the competitive search model. The baseline 
model is heavily borrowed from Leung & Zhang (2007) with minor adjustment 
to the rental and housing markets. 
2.1 The Basic Setting 
In this section, we will discuss the setup for our baseline model. Time is contin-
uous. We model a real estate market for housing service with two submarkets 
indexed by i = 1, 2. There is a continuum of corresponding buyers , B 1 , in sub-
market 1, and the housing market and lessees, B 2 , in submarket 2, the rental 
market. The agents in the demand side are heterogeneous in their preference, 
as some of them would enter the housing market or else would enter the rental 
markets. In addition to taste, they are different in terms of their waiting cost, 
Ci . Similarly, the sellers in submarket 1 are denoted as sl and lessors in sub-
market 2 as S2 . Note that Bi and S1 denote not only the identity of certain 
types of agents but also their measures in the model. 
In each submarket i, the number of successful matchings in an infinitesi-
mal period is governed by a random matching function , Mi (Bi, Si), which is 
positive but is diminishing marginal returns in each argument, that is , 
Mi,l (B, S) > 0; M i,2 (B, S) > 0; Mi,n (B, S) < 0; Mi,22 (B, S) < 0 (2.1) 
10 
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We also assume that the matching functions exhibit constant return to scale 
in both B and S. 
The market tightness {)i in submarket i is defined as 
which is the ratio of buyer measures over seller measures in submarket i . In 
each submarket i, TJi is defined as the flow of matching rate for a buyer /lessee 
to find a seller /lessor in submarket i such that 
(2.2) 
Similarly, the flow of matching rate for a seller /lessor to find a buyer /lessee, 
J.-li, satisfies 
Mi (Bi, Si) ( ) 
J.-Li = si = Mi ei, 1 = ei'TJi (2.3) 
To fully characterize the model, we shall introduce additional notations 
regarding the flow values. We denote the entry value of sellers as IIi , and define 
Vi as the value for buyers (V1 ) and lessees (V2 ) ; and n is the value of a house 
owners in submarket 1, and W is the value of a tenant with flow rate utility r, 
together with <!? for the value of the landlord in submarket 2. When matched 
in submarket 1, the buyer and seller exit the market. However, in submarket 2 
after the match, the lessor and the lessee become a pair with a poisson rate of 
f3 to destroy the rent contract; then there is a return to the unmatched lessors 
and lessees. Only a one-to-one match is allowed in the model. For simplicity, 
we assume that both n and r are exogenously determined. 
The Bellman equations in submarket 1 are 
rii1 = 111 (P- II1) 
rV1 = -c1 + "71 (D- T P- V1) 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
with P denoting the housing price, and T summarizing the transaction costs 
such as commissions and financing costs. Note that II1 is the expected utility 
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of a seller, and V1 is the expected utility of a buyer in the housing market. We 
can interpret the terms r Ih and r V1 as the flow utility of being a seller and a 
buyer in submarket 1, the housing market. Thus Equation (2.4) implies that 
the flow utility of being a seller is equal to the flow matching rate for a seller to 
find a buyer, multiplied to the net gain from such trade, which is housing price 
P, the latter is determined by the bargaining process which will be discussed 
later, the net of utility of a buyer in the housing market, 111. 
Similarly, Equation (2.5) implies that the flow utility of being a buyer, r Vi, 
is equal to the negative waiting cost for an unmatched status, -c1 , added to 
the flow matching rate for a buyer to find a seller multiplied to the net gain 
from trade, which is the utility of being a house owner n net of the cost, the 
housing price P, and the utility of being an unmatched buyer Vi. We could 
obtain the Bellman equations in submarket 2 as 
r112 = f-1,2 (~- 112) 
~~ = R + ,8 (112 - ~) 
rV2 = -c2 + rJ2 (w - V2) 





with R denoting the rent. Equations (2.6) and (2.8) are the direct analogies 
for being a lessor and a lessee in the rental market, to (2.4) and (2.5) for 
being a seller and a buyer in the housing market. However, the newly added 
Equations (2.7) and (2.9) describe the valuations of being a matched landlord 
and a tenant. Following the same notation, Equation (2. 7) implies that the flow 
utility of being a landlord, ~~ , is equal to the rental rate, R, plus the destroy 
probability ,8 multiplied to the net gain of such shock, which is the utility of 
being an unmatched lessor, 112 , net of the utility of being a matched landlord, 
~- And Equation (2.8) implies that the flow utility of being a matched tenant, 
rW, is equal to the rental rate plus the destroy probability ,8 multiplied to the 
net gain of such events occurring, which is the utility of being an unmatched 
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lessee V2 , net of the utility of being a matched tenant, W. 
From these Bellman equations (2.5) - (2.9) we obtain 
p 
IT - /-Llp 1-
r + /-Ll 1 + r I /-Ll 
-c1 + 771 (n- T P) -c1l771 + (n- T P) 
vl = = --------
' + 771 1 + r I 771 
<P = R + ,BI12 = RI ,8 + I12 
r+,B 1+ri,B 
w _ r - R + ,BV2 _ (r - R) 1 ,B + v2 
- r+,B - 1+ri,B 
I1
2 
= J-L2R Rlr 
r ( r + ,8 + /-L2) 1 + ( r + ,8 ) I 1-L2 
-c2 (r +,B) + 772 (r- R) -c2 (r +,B) lr772 + (r- R) lr 
v2 = = -----------








Note that in the Poisson process with an arrival rate of J-li, the expected 
time-on-the-market is just 111-li· Consequently, Equation (2.10) means that 
the seller 's value equals the housing price multiplied to the discount factor 
associated with the waiting period. Note also that 11771 is indeed the mean 
waiting time for the buyer in submarket 1. Hence, Equation (2.11) means that 
the buyer 's value equals the discounted net gain from purchasing a house, 
while the net gain is the consumer's surplus net of the waiting cost during 
the waiting period. Equation (2.12) states the landlord 's valuation equals the 
present value of the rental rate, which is the sum over the expected length of 
the rental contract 11 ,8, plus the valuation of being an unmatched seller I12 , 
multiplied to the discount factor associated with the waiting period for a shock 
to hit the contract 1 + r I ,B . Similarly, Equation (2.13) means that the tenant 's 
valuation equals the present value of being the matched tenant, r, minus the 
cost, the rental rate, R, over the expected length of the rental contract , plus 
the valuation of being an unmatched lessee in submarket 2, multiplied to the 
discount factor associated with the waiting period for a separation shock to 
hit the rental contract. 
Equations (2.14) and (2.15) are logic analogs of Equations (2.10) and (2.11) 
Chapter 2 The Model 14 
1n the rental market. They state the relationship between the valuation of 
lessors and lessees and the matching probabilities, waiting cost, and separation 
rates, together with the utility gain of such trades. 
In the baseline model, we treat the buyer reservation values (Ili), the value 
for owning a house (D), the value for renting a house (r), and the numbers 
of buyers (Bi) and sellers (Si) as exogenous variables. As will be shown later 
in Section 3, the relaxation of these restrictions would not affect the main 
qualitative results. 
2.2 Basic Assumptions of the Model 
To begin with the discussion, we specify several assumptions for the whole 
model setup. 
Assumption 1. The sellers' value in both markets is the same, that is, Il1 = 
rr2. 
The first assumption states that sellers can freely move in-between the 
submarkets, and hence the sellers' reservation value in both markets is the 
same. 
Assumption 2. All n, r , Ci are exogenously determined. 
The second assumption here is that several parameters are exogenous. How-
ever, we may extend this assumption from static to process in the dynamic 
context. We will briefly discuss this issue in Section 3. 
Assumption 3. The time preference r for both submarkets is the same. 
Time preference heterogeneity may exist to some extent. However, to avoid 
technicalities and state our intuition clearly, we fix the time preferences in both 
submarkets to be equal. These assumptions are more or less unrealistic, but 
they provide a simplified environment for us to analyze the model. 
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2.3 The Bargaining Process 
We employ N ash bargaining to determine the price and rent in the submarkets, 
which conform well with reality. The housing price under a competitive market 
is determined by theN ash bargaining procedure, and therefore, it requires us to 
solve the following joint surplus maximization problem in different submarkets. 
In submarket 1 
(2.16) 
where o:1 is the bargaining power of sellers, and 1 - o:1 is the bargaining power 
of buyers in submarket 1. The solution is therefore 
(2.17) 
Plugging VS_ and IT1 derived by Equations (2.10) and (2.11) into Equation 
(2.17), we know1 
In submarket 2 
P = o:1 (rn + c1) (r + f.-Ll) 
TT (r + 171- 0:1 (171- /-Ll)) (2.18) 
(2.19) 
where o:2 is the bargaining power of lessors , and 1 - o:2 is the bargaining power 
of lessees in submarket 2. By plugging II2 and V2 obtained from Equations 
( 2.14) and ( 2.15) into the bargaining problem ( 2.19) , the solution is therefore 
(2.20) 
Plugging V2 and IT2 derived by Equations (2.13) and (2.14) into Equation 
(2.17), we know 
R = (r + f3 + f.-L2) o:2 (h + c2) 
r + f3 + (1 - o:2) 172 + o:2/-L2 (2.21) 
1 We consider V1 and Ih as aggregate variables, and assume that individual agents would 
take these values as given; thus , they do not enter joint surplus maximization directly. This 
is also true for V2 and II2 in submarket 2. 
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The relationship between the seller's entry value and the market tightness 
from the bargaining solution both in submarkets 1 and 2 is of our interest. 
Proposition 1 states the equilibrium relationship between IIi and ei for i = 1, 2. 
Proposition 1. An increase in IIi would lead to an increase in ei, holding 
other parameters unchanged, which implies a higher entry cost, and in turn a 
higher market tightness in both submarkets. 
Proof. First, we focus on submarket 1, the housing market. Using Equations 
(2.10) and (2.18), we can eliminate P; with further manipulations, we can 
derive the following relationship between the seller's entry value and the market 
tightness from the bargaining solution in submarket 1 
Note that here, we only focus on variables 81 and II1 . Since M1 ( ·, ·) is increasing 
in its arguments, we know that M 1 ( 1, 0
1
,) is decreasing when 81 is increasing, 
and M1 ( ()1 , 1) is increasing when ()1 is increasing, while its inverse would rather 
decrease. This also holds for 1/()1 . In the LHS, we know that II1 is at the 
denominator. Thus, we know that an increase in II1 will lead to an increase in 
81 . Thus, the entry value of sellers II1 in submarket 1 is related to the market 
tightness 81 . Similarly, using Equations (2.14) and (2.21), we could derive the 
following relationship in submarket 2: 
(2.23) 
Here, we restrict our attention to the variables ()2 and II2 . Similar to the above 
arguments, the inverse of M2 (()2 , 1) is decreasing when ()2 is increasing, and so 
does the inverse of ()2 itself, which implies that the increase in rr2 will lead to 
an increase in ()2 . Thus, the entry value of sellers II2 in sub market 2 is related 
to market tightness ()2 . Thus, the proposition is justified. 0 
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2.4 The Determination of Ratios 
2.4.1 The Rent-Price Ratio 
The assumption of the free flow of sellers is crucial in the analysis. Based 
on this assumption, sellers are free to enter either submarkets and we have 
II1 = II2 ; equating Equations (2.10) and (2.14) imply 
Rlr p (2.24) 
1 + (r + (3 ) I P,2 
As a result, the rent-price ratio, denoted as A, is determined by 
A = R = rT (1 + (r + (3 ) I J-l2) 
- P (1 + rlp,1) (2.25) 
Note that 1 I p,1 denotes the mean expected time for sale, and 1 I p,2 also 
denotes the mean expected time for rent; both are referred to the time on the 
market. We could explain Equation (2.25) as follows. The rent price ratio is 
increasing in the parameter associated with transaction cost T and the time 
on the market. When the transaction cost is higher, the rent price ratio would 
increase as well. However, when the time on the market becomes smaller, 
the rent price ratio would decrease. More explicitly, A is increasing in I-ll and 
decreasing in p,2. This structural relationship derived from the above model 
can be verified empirically in the next subsection. 
2.5 Empirical Evidence 
It is necessary to justify our theoretical implication empirically by bringing 
the model to the data. Our core equation indicates that there is a relationship 
between the rent price ratio and the time on the market in the housing and 
rental markets, in the search equilibrium. However, the data for the time on the 
market is quite limited to having a long-term time series in the macro sense-
rather, in micro housing units, there are oftentimes regional levels. In contrast, 
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vacancy rates are available for a long period of time, and in national wide. We 
present links between the time on the market and the vacancy rates in the 
following subsections and discuss the empirical results for the estimations. 
2.5.1 Data Sources 
The baseline model involves data such as the time senes of housing pnce, 
rental rate , and vacancy rates in the market. There are two types of housing 
prices: the first is from the Case-Shiller-Weiss index, which is constituted by 
the transaction data in major cities. The other is from the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight ( OFHEO). Both groups of data, in quarters, 
are available at Robert Shiller's Web site. For rental rate, since there is no 
systematic time-series record, we employ the series discussed in Davis et al. 
(2008). In their paper, they based on observable records to recover the rental 
rate time series since 1960 through interpolation. We adopt this rental rate for 
our empirical analysis since it is the longest one to match our price data. 
The vacancy rates are from the 'Housing Vacancies and Homeownership 
Survey (CPS/HVS) ' of the U.S. Census Bureau. In their historical tables, we 
can find quarterly rental vacancy rates and quarterly homeowner vacancy rates. 
The vacancy rate in the housing market is defined as the vacant housing units 
over housing stocks. Similarly, the vacancy rate in the rental market is the 
vacant rental units over the total rental units2 . We also adopt the median ask 
rents and median price as substitutes to the above price time series, but with 
much less length since 1988. We adopt these results from the estimation from 
monthly data as complements to our benchmark estimation. All data are for 
the entire U.S economy. We present the summary statistics for this dataset in 
the following table. 
2 For a more detailed discussion of definitions, please consult Census Bureau's Web site. 
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Variables Mean Median Max M in St.Dev 
Price(CSW) 96231.21 73995.85 303265.2 14444.86 80112.69 
Price(OFHEO) 93145.65 73995.85 266198.9 14444.86 73513.37 
Rent 4327.287 3921.755 10200.53 809.55 2942.417 
Vac. Rates(Rent) 7.229381 7.4 10.4 5 1.486385 
Vac. Rates(Housing) 1.515979 1.5 2.9 0.9 0.364915 
Table 2.1: Quarterly Summary Statistics of Price and Vacancy Data 
2.5.2 Estimation Strategy 
There is a large body of literature discussing the relationship between time on 
the market and vacancy rates. Conventional wisdom would state the inverse 
relationship between these two variables. The intuition here is that for a house 
seller, if there is a longer time for her /him to stay in the market to find a 
trading partner , in aggregate sense, the market would accumulate more un-
matched sellers and thus the vacancy rates would have a positive relationship 
with the time on the market, here the inverse of /-Li · Assume the functional re-
lationship between the time on the market and the vacancy rate in equilibrium 
is summarized by 
1 
- = f i (vi) 
/-Li 
by manipulating the rent-price ratio equation, we have 
In(~) lnr+lnT+In(l+r;
2
!3) -ln(l+ ;J 
r + (3 r ~ ln r + ln T + -- - -
/-L2 /-Ll 
~ c +f31!1(vl)+ f32 !2(v2)+ E 
where f3i are the scalar coefficients or the vector to the vacancy rates polyno-
mials. We use several functional forms for approximation, including linear and 
quadratics. For estimation samples, we perform the estimation with a whole 
sample and with rolling window estimation. 
Assuming function fi is linear, we have the structural relationship 
In(~) = c + iJ1v1 + iJ2v2 + E 
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It is straightforward to argue the size of f3i to justify our analysis empirically. 
Then in another case, if we assume there is a quadratic term in fi, we arrive 
at 
Since now, the marginal effect of vacancy rates on the rent price ratio is a linear 
function of vacancy, we use the average value of /3i1 + 2f3i2vi to determine the 
relationship between variables of interest. We also try out several other settings, 
such as cubic and nonparametric estimations and results are robust to these 
variations. 
We first restrict our attention to the period before the financial deregula-
tion in 1992. Thus, the sample of our estimation is limited from 1960 to 1991. 
In total, we have 124 quarterly observations. As Ngai & Tenreyro (2008) doc-
umented in their paper, there are severeal seasonal patterns in the price data. 
Thus, we first deseasonalize our pricing data. We report the estimation results 
and discussions in the following section. 
2.5.3 Estimation Results and Discussions 
We present our estimation results in the following table. The regressand of 
all regressions below is the logarithm of the rent price ratio, since CSW and 
OFHEO are the same before 2000, we have the same results using two series of 
the rent price ratio. The left two columns present the estimation results from 
our full sample from the first quarter of 1960 to the fourth quarter of 1996, be-
fore the housing price boom, with 148 observations. We employ simple ordinary 
least square estimation techniques. We first report the linear approximation 
results. In the baseline regression, the coefficient before the vacancy rate of 
rental market is 0.016, which significantly deviates from zero. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient in front of the housing vacancy rate is -0.162 and is significant at 1% 
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level, which is consistent with our prediction. Later, we adopt quadratic ap-
proximation for estimation. We report the estimation result in the quadratic 
column. We calculate the average marginal effect of vacancy rates in rental 
market, which is 0.015, and those of vacancy rates in the housing market is 

























Average Marginal Effect 
f3n + 2f321x1 
/321 + 2f322X2 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
*** represents significance at 1% level 
** represents significance at 5% level 















Table 2.2: Estimation Result for Structural Equations 
In the right two columns, we investigate the robustness of our regression. We 
use rolling window estimation to repeat estimation of the coefficients specified 
above. The windows is 20 years, with 80 observations in each regression. We 
average the coefficients obtained in the regressions and report them in bottom. 
To sum up, our estimations justify our theoretical prediction on the rela-
tionship between rent price ratio and vacancy rates in the housing and rental 
markets. Since our theory is not completed as we do not specify the population 
flow , we will discuss the model in the long run and short run in the subsequent 
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sections. 
Chapter 3 
The Model in the Long Run 
3 .1 Assumptions 
Prior to the detailed discussion of the long-run model setup, we clarify our 
assumptions in the long-run model. 
Assumption 4. There is a free entry for sellers, which implies that the reser-
vation value of sellers is fixed at IT. 
This assumption is to fix the entry cost in the long run. It is natural to 
consider the entry cost as a process over time, but, due to the static nature 
of search models, we only consider the fixed entry cost here . Later, we would 
provide comparative statics and dynamics if we can allow the entry cost to be 
a process rather than a constant. 
Assumption 5 . Buyers' and lessees' reservation values V1 and V2 are endog-
enized. 
Since we consider a fixed population inflow for buyers and lessees, this 
assumption is inevitable. It simplifies the model with perfect segregation be-
tween submarkets and perfect free flow for sellers . We will discuss extensions 
to violate these assumptions to some extent in Section 6. 
23 
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3.2 Population Dynamics of the Model 
To fully depict the model, it is necessary to analyze the demographic change 
of the economy. We consider the following dynamic flow of buyers, lessees, 
and sellers, ( B1 , B2 , S). In the long-run model, based on the assumption that 
sellers are free to enter the market, an endogenized inflow of sellers would arrive 
in the market. In the meanwhile, as we also assume endogenized valuation in 
buyers and lessees, there is an exogenous inflow of B 1 and B2 arriving in the 
submarkets at rate b1 and b2 , whereas buyers form matches and exit the market 
at the rate f/l and become rental pairs at rate rJ2 . Therefore, we have following 
population dynamics for buyers and lessees 
B2 = b2 - rJ2B2 + (3N 




Equation (3.1) simply states that the population change of buyers in sub-
market 1 summarizes the difference between the inflow of buyers (bl) and the 
outflow of buyers, as the outcomes of matching, (rJ1 B 1). Similarly, Equation 
(3.2) provides intuition regarding lessees' population dynamics, which is the 
inflow of lessees from the outside (b2), the outflow of matches, (TJ2B2), and also 
the current matching pairs through separation shocks, (3N. Equation (3.3) is 
for rental pairs, with an inflow of (TJ2B2) and an outflow of (3 N. Assuming that 
sellers enter the market at rate a+ 4; (II - fi), we have 
The second equality is similar to the analysis of Equation (3.2). 
At the steady state in the long run, the flow of change of buyers and sellers 
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should be static; we thus have following equations 
b1 - TJ1B1 = 0 
b2 - TJ2 B2 + (3 N = 0 
TJ2B2 + (3N = 0 






As our interest is the inflow rate of sellers in the equilibrium, from (3.5) , (3.6) 
and (3.7) we know that 
b1 = M1s1 = TJ1B1 
b2 = 1-L2S2- (3N = rJ2B2- (3N 
Adding both equations together, we have 
The second equality thus holds by Equation (3.8). This implies that in the 
search equilibrium, the inflow of new buyers and lessees will equal the inflow 
of sellers. If we further assume that in equilibrium the rental pairs would 
be constant over time, we would require b2 to be zero. Since we impose this 
restriction on b2 , the population would never grow to infinity. 
3.3 Comparative Statics 
We first focus on core equations (2.22) and (2.23). For housing market, we 
know that for the relationship between other exogenous variables and market 
tightness fh, only the bargaining power for sellers, a 1 , and the parameter as-
sociated with the transaction cost T are ambiguous. Their relationship would 
largely depend on the functional form of the matching function and the param-
eters setting in the numerical simulation, whereas other variables have global 
monotonic relationship with market tightness. 
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In the rental market, except for the bargaining power for lessors a 2 , other 
variables have a monotonic relationship with market tightness. Thus, in the 
following simulation practice, the readers should be aware that most of our 
studies' results are hold globally, with the effects from a few variables, as 
mentioned above, illustrated in the local sense. 
To obtain a closed form solution, we assume the random matching function 
to be 
where mi captures the different matching technologies exhibited in different 
submarkets. 1 To calibrate the model, we make further assumptions on the 
search equilibrium conditions. 
Assumption 6. The equilibrium market tightness, on the average, is approx-
imately unity, which implies that there are approximately equal buyers and 
sellers in the submarket. 
This assumption enables us to identify other parameters rather than nor-
malization. Indeed, we are not the first to employ such assumption.Peterson 
(2009) shared the same assumption with us in the housing market, and in Diaz 
& Jerez (2008) simulation results, the equilibrium market tightness is close to 
unity. Based on this assumption, our flow finding rate is directly related to mi, 
which is 
To measure mi, we further define the empirical flow finding rate as 
Total Population 
p,1 = scale parameters x . . f 1 Housing units or sa e 
1The author thank Prof. Chong Kee Yip for pointing this out. 
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To determine the scale parameter in order to construct the flow finding rate 




Average Month of Supply 
10.733 
10.867 






Table 3.1: Existing Home Sales and Month of Supply 
Thus, we could determine that the flow finding rate in the housing market 
is approximately 0.28 for quarterly data. We can match our last observation 
in data to match this value in order to determine the scale parameters by 
approximately 1/850. Since we assume, on the average, that market tightness 
is unity, we could have 
by matching the first-order moment condition. The next step is to calculate T/l 
when we have 'm1 and 111 at hand. By definition, we know 
and this equation requires non-negative probabilities, which implies max 111 ~ 
'm1 , and the matching outcome should be less than the matching input, which 
is 'm1 ~ 2 and m 2 ~ 1~:2 ; finally, we reach jl1 = 0.38 and m 1 = 0.76. To 
establish the benchmark case, we use the following approach. Vve assume that 
the market tightness at equilibrium is unity as well. We also specify the rent 
price ratio to be about 0.0504, with price level of around 10 million and rental 
rate of around 5040 dollars per annual. Other parameters are specified in Table 
3.2 
Assume in the search equilibrium that the rental pair mass N is set at 
9.164. Note here that the long-run equilibrium implies that B1 = S1 = ,~~ and 
B2 = s2 = (3 N . Thus. in this long-run equilibrium, we specify the population 
T/2 
2Data from the National Association of REALTORs 2009. 
Chapter 3 The Model in the Long Run 28 
Parameter Values Parameter Value Parameter Value 
l"Xl 0.5 T 1.1 ml 0.760 
l"X2 0.5 f3 0.125 m2 0.921 
gl 1 g2 1 IT 97435.897 
T 0.01 rn +cl 6000 r + c2 2520 
1--tl 0.38 f.-t2 0.46 scale coef. 2 6.552 x 10-3 
R 5040 p 1 X 105 scale coef. 1 1.177 X 10-3 
Table 3.2: Parameters Setting in the Benchmark Model 
mass as E 1 = 2.632, E 2 = 2.482, and S = E 1 + E2 = 5.113 with b1 = 1 and 
b2 = 0. 
3.4 Simulation Results in the Long Run 
We first characterize the simulation to illustrate the comparative statics in the 
long run. Now we restrict our attention only to the parameters involved in 
housing market, which are the bargaining power of sellers cx1 , the matching 
function coefficient, m 1 , the per period valuation of owning a housing unit, 
r-n + c1 , and finally, the transaction cost summarized by T. 
3.4.1 Housing Market Parameters Variation 
Bargaining Power In our benchmark case, we set the bargaining power of 
sellers cx 1 to be 0.5, which implies equal bargaining power when buyers and 
sellers negotiate. Now, we vary cx1 from [0.4, 0.7] to examine the equilibrium 
outcomes. 
Figure A.l is about Here 
With a higher bargaining power, sellers can gain more from the existing 
trade, which would induce more sellers in the housing market, thus decreasing 
market tightness and increasing the vacancy rate. Consequently, the flow prob-
ability of sales decreases and the flow probability of buying increases. On the 
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contrary, the time on the market is longer and the time to buy is shorter with 
a higher bargaining power for sellers. Since the price is determined by bargain-
ing, with higher bargaining power of sellers, the price will certainly increase. 
The interesting part here is that buyers' value increases with bargaining power. 
Since the valuation is composed of price and matching rate, now, the price ef-
fect is dominated by the matching rate effect, implying a higher valuation of 
being buyers induced by an increase in the bargaining power of sellers. 
Matching Function Coefficient Now we turn to the matching function 
coefficient, m 1 . The benchmark case m 1 is set to be 0. 76, which indicates 
that in equilibrium the flow matching rate for a seller to locate a buyer is 
approximately 0.38, based on our assumption that in the long-run equilibrium 
market tightness is unity. 
Figure A.2 is about Here 
With faster matching technology, the equilibrium market tightness is higher. 
With a higher market tightness, there are relatively more sellers than buyers 
in the housing market, the supply side is abundant now, and thus the price 
declines. The valuation of being a buyer is higher, since now, the matching 
rate is higher, and the price is lower. Thus, faster matching technology ben-
efits both buyers and sellers, and the flow probabilities of selling and buying 
are higher with a higher m 1 , whereas the time on the market and the time to 
buy are decreasing. 
House Owners' Value Next, we focus ou the utility gain from owning a 
house for buyers, rD. + c1 . The term is composed of two parts, with discounted 
utility gain from the housing service, rD., and with current waiting cost for 
delaying purchase, c1 . Since their effects on other endogenous variables are the 
same, we combine them into one graph to illustrate the idea. This parameter 
can be interpreted as the quality of housing. The higher the quality of housing 
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units, the higher utility buyers would enjoy. With a higher utility gain from 
trade, there is no doubt that the valuation increases for buyers, which results 
in a higher price. This higher price would induce more sellers to the housing 
market, drive down the market tightness, and increase the vacancy rate. This 
would benefit buyers' valuation, with price efFect dominated by the matching 
rate effect. To matching probabilities, the flow probabilities of selling and buy-
ing are lower and higher, respectively. On the contrary, the time on the market 
and the time to buy increases and decreases with the increase in utility gain 
from trade for buyers in the housing market. 
Figure A.3 is about Here 
Transaction Cost Finally, we turn to the core variable in the analysis, 
the parameter associated with the transaction cost for trading, T. We set the 
benchmark case T to be 1.1, which implies 10% transaction cost associated with 
the trade. We vary T from 1 to 1.18, with no transaction cost at all to as large 
as 18% transaction costs associated with the trade. With a higher transaction 
cost, there is a higher price need to be paid by buyers, and consequently, the 
buyer would adjust price level down, which impedes sellers. Hence, the market 
tightness is increasing. However, given the same utility gain from housing, the 
price becomes lower. Now, the matching rate effect is dominated by the price 
effect , and the buyers' valuation decreases. 
Figure A.4 is about Here 
The flow probability of selling is higher given that there are relatively more 
buyers in the market; on the contrary, the flow probability of buying is lower. 
Thus, the duration time on the market for a seller is decreasing, and the 
duration time to buy for a buyer is increasing. 
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3.4.2 Rental Market Parameters Variation 
In the following simulation example, we mainly focus on the parameters in-
volved in the rental market. 
Separation Rate First, we present the change in separation rate f3 affecting 
the long-run equilibrium. In our benchmark case, we set f3 to be 0.125 , which 
captures the idea that normal rental contract will expire about 2 year, that 
is , 8 quarters. When f3 becomes bigger, the expected rental duration would 
be shorter. We examine f3 in the range of [0.11, 0.15], which implies that the 
rental contract lasts between 6.6 to 9 quarters. 
Figure A.5 is about Here 
As we observed in the above figure, in the long run, housing and rental 
markets are perfectly segmented, and a change in a variable specifically applied 
to one submarket would not change the equilibrium conditions in another 
submarket. Thus, in the above and following simulations in the long run, there 
is one line that is always constant. In the case of varying f3, when the separation 
rate is larger, the market tightness in the rental market increases, that is 
due to the separation rate being higher; given the population mass, there are 
more lessees looking for rents in the equilibrium, which leads to higher market 
tightness. When there are more lessees in the market, and more demand faced 
by lessors, the rental rate would increase, which is illustrated in the second 
plot. Since this rental rate increases, the surplus of lessees would decrease, 
which makes buyer status less valuable. Regarding the vacancy, since there are 
more buyers, the vacancy rate decreases. Moreover, with more lessees and equal 
lessors, the flow probabilities of finding a trade partner for a lessor increases, 
in the meantime, it would be more difficult for a lessee to locate a lessor, and 
thus the flow probabilities of buying decreases. On the inverse, the time on the 
market decreases and the time to buy increases. The intuition is presented as 
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above, and we now begin to discuss the simulation of the matching function 
coefficient in subn1arket 2 ( m 2). 
Figure A.6 is about Here 
Matching Coefficients The benchmark setting of m 2 is around 0.107, which 
implies that in equilibrium, the flow finding rate for a seller to locate a buyer is 
around 0.053, this is with the assumption that in the long-run equilibrium, the 
market tightness in rental market is unity. The benchmark indicates that the 
matching technology is much lower in the rental market than in the housing 
market given the empirical support that there are much more sellers, or units 
for rent, existing in the market. Obviously, with a faster matching rate, there 
are higher flow probabilities of selling and buying rates in the rental market, 
which is illustrated in subplots 5 and 6, then since there are inverse relation-
ships between these probabilities and the time on the market and the time to 
buy, there are shorter durations in the market. Since it would be easier for 
lessees to find a lessor , the valuation of lessees increases with the matching 
coefficient, and in return, the rental rate decreases as well. Moreover, a faster 
matching technology also drives down the vacancy rate in the rental market 
as compared to the benchmark technology, as it is easy to match, and it holds 
the population mass to be the same. 
Figure A.7 is about Here 
Rents's Valuation Next, we will turn to the change in utility gain from 
rent r + c2 . The definition is similar to the buyer 's valuation in the previous 
section. This utility gain is calibrated at 2520 in the long-run equilibrium in 
order to capture the annualized rental rate to be 5040 , which matches the rent-
price ratio in data. The intuition of this simulation is quite straight forward. 
With a higher utility gain from rent, the rent should be higher, but the net 
of this cost, the valuation of being a lessee, is still increasing. With other 
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parameters constant, the left-hand-side of the equation (2.23) increases, which 
leads to a decrease in market tightness. With this fact, the flow probability 
of sale decreases while the flow probability of buying increases. Furthermore, 
the time on the market will increase and the time to buy will decrease with 
a higher utility gain from rent. Similarly, we obtain our simulation results by 
varying the bargaining power for lessors o:2 . 
Figure A.8 is about Here 
Sellers' Entry Value Finally we try to vary the seller's entry value in the 
long run, fi, in order to see its impact on the equilibrium. Bear in mind that 
the sellers first enter the market then decide which submarket to enter, and 
thus the change of this value would change the equilibrium outcomes in both 
submarkets. 
Figure A.9 is about Here 
When the entry value is increasing, the entry cost becomes higher for the 
seller. Thus, in total, there are less sellers in the market, which leads to the 
increases in market tightness in both submarkets and less vacancy rates. Facing 
less supply, the buyers in submarkets can only adjust their price and rental rate 
to make the deal. With less sellers and a higher price, the composition of the 
matching rate effect and the price effect will drive down the buyers' valuation. 
The followings reasonings are then straightforward. With less sellers, it is easier 
for a seller to locate a buyer, and in the meantime, it is harder for a seller to find 
a buyer. Hence, the flow probability of selling increases and the flow probability 
of buying decreases. Their inverses, the time on the market and the time to 
buy decreases and increases, respectively. 
Bargaining Power Many of the results in this simulation are similar to 
those of the simulation of bargaining power for sellers in housing market o:1. 
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However, they only differ in terms of buyer's valuation. In this case, we could 
observe the turning point in buyer's valuation by the composition effect. When 
the bargaining power is less than 0.5, the price effect dominates, and the buyer's 
valuation increases with bargaining power. When the bargaining power exceeds 
0.5, the matching rate effect dominates. In this case, there is a decrease in 
buyer's valuation in relation to the increase bargaining power for sellers in the 
housing market. 
3.5 Discussion 
The whole simulation practice is based on the assumption made in the long run 
model. Then since there is perfect segmentation, we could observe clearly from 
the simulation, except for the changes on the seller's entry value which would 
affect both submarkets, that changes in the variables in a specific submarket 
would not affect the other market's equilibrium. After all , the economy in this 
model has the ability to adjust its population to fit the new equilibrium, and 
is why the segmentation works. Moreover, this is the point that our model 
deviates from the work of Wheaton (1990) and other follow-up works, such as 
Diaz & Jerez (2008), which does not include the measure of inactive agents 
in the population as we do not explicitly argue the raise of sellers due to 
mismatch, but rather from a developer point of view. 
In addition, the only decision made in this economy is the entry of the 
seller. Throughout the model, the sellers can instantaneously responded to 
the changes in the market without any delay. However, it would not alter the 
situation in the long run, since the long run tends to ignore any time in the 
model. However, such settings will become critical in the short run equilibrium, 
as will be discussed in the next section. We will go back to this point later. 
Chapter 4 
The Model in the Short Run 
4 .1 Assumptions in the Short Run 
To start our short-run model, let us first specify some of the assumptions for 
the short-run model. 
A ssumption 7. There is no free entry for sellers. Sellers' reservation value 
now is endogenized. 
This assumption states that in the short run, there is no new supply in 
the housing and rental market, and thus for some shocks to hit the economy, 
it is only possible for sellers to switch between the submarket for adjustment 
to their own interests. Since now, the population inflow is fixed at a constant, 
zero, the entry value, or the reservation value, is now endogenously determined 
through sellers' optimization. This may conform with the reality that housing 
units are subject to construction and other processes that transform them into 
sellable units, within a relatively short period of time, thus, it is possible that 
there is no new supply in the market, whereas only existing sellers can choose 
entry and exit in the submarkets .1 
1 As we do not specify this in the model, we do not allow rest in sellers and buyers, that 
is, sellers and buyers actively give up their search probabilities. Since in the baseline model, 
we do not introduce the search effort cost, it is always profitable to undertake the search 
process even if we introduce the search effort cost. Furthermore, we can set the entry cost 
to be so high that it would be too costly to reenter the market once one withdraws from it. 
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Assumption 8. Th ere is no exogenous inflow of buyers and sel lers outside 
the model. 
This assumption postulates that there is no new demand for housing in 
both submarkets , which greatly simplifies our analysis. Since there is no new 
demand, the model becomes static in population in some sense, and we only 
need to deal with the population outflow specified by the matching technolo-
gies . In sum, these assumptions allow us to analyze how agents behave in 
the short term when there is no outside supply and demand in the model, 
which further elaborates the idea of competitive search that we employed in 
the model. 
4.2 Short-run Dynamics 
In the short-run search equilibrium, the population of buyers is fixed, and we 
know the measure of buyers and total sellers. We have two equations in hand: 
first is the free flow condition for sellers. 
with 
( r + j3 ) 1r 2 ( c2 + r) 
n1 (rn +cl) ( 4.1) 
M2 (82) (1 + (r + /3 ) /M (82, 1)) (r + j3 + n2 (M (1, 1/82) - M (82, 1))) 
(4.2) 
M 1 (81) (1 + r/M (81 , 1)) (1 +(M (1 , 1/81)- M (81, 1)) (1- n1)) (4.3) 
and the second is the total sellers 
(4.4) 
From these two equations, we could obtain the market tightness, and then we 
could obtain sellers ' entry value IT. In the following simulation practice, we 
follow the parameters in the above example. 
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4.3 Simulation Results in the Short Run 
We bear in mind now that the population mass is fixed at the long-run search 
equilibriun1 level. Any change in the parameters would affect the equilibrium 
outcomes of both submarkets simultaneously. In the short run, besides the 
usual exogenous variables considered in the long-run case, now there are more 
variables that need to be taken into account, which are the buyers' population, 
B 1 , the lessees' population, B 2 , and the sellers' population, S. However, since 
the entry value is endogenously determined, we cannot treat it as an exogenous 
parameter in the simulation, but we rather use it as one of the equilibrium 
outcomes. 
Bargaining Powers We first turn to the bargaining power that sellers have 
in submarket 1, a 1 . 
Figure B .1 is about Here 
The simulation results suggest that given the population mass at our bench-
mark case, a higher bargaining power would attract more sellers to move to 
the housing market, leading to market tightness in the housing market decline; 
meanwhile , since there is a fixed population of sellers, the market tightness of 
the rental market raises. Thus, with a higher bargaining power, the price would 
increase, and with less sellers in the rental market, the rental rate has to be 
adjusted upward. Hence in the housing market the match rate effect is dom-
inated by the price effect, and the valuation of buyers decreases, whereas in 
the rental market , both price effect and matching rate effect drive down the 
lessee's valuation. Thus, in total, we observe the downward slopping curve of 
the rent price ratio and the increasing seller's entry value. Next, we turn to 
the bargaining power that sellers have in submarket 2, a 2 . 
Figure B.2 is about Here 
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As you can seen, the intuition behind is almost the same with that of a 1, 
just with an opposite direction of changes; thus we'll skip discussion here. 
Separation Rate Then we turn to the separation rate in rental market, f3. 
Figure B.3 is about Here 
With a higher separation rate, the market tightness in the rental market in-
creases, which is consistent with the results in the long run. However , with a 
fixed population of sellers, the market tightness of the housing market can-
not hold constant now, but rather, it decreases with the separation rate. This 
change in market tightness implies that there are more sellers in the housing 
market , and thus the housing price declines, whereas the rental rate goes up. 
Thus , the composition of price effect and matching rate effect increases the 
buyers ' valuation but drives down the lessee ' valuation. Hence, the rent price 
ratio increases whereas the seller 's entry value decreases with a increase in 
f3 . Other equilibrium outcomes are from the same intuition, which we do not 
repeat here. 
Matching Coefficients We next examine the matching function coefficient 
in the housing and rental markets, m 1 and m 2 . With higher matching function 
coefficients , given number of buyers and sellers is the same, there are more 
matches produced by the matching process. We first take a look at an increase 
in m 2 . Obviously, the sellers observed there have higher matching probabilities 
for them to find a trading partner, and thus in the short run, sellers would 
move to the rental market, which drives down the market tightness in the 
rental market, and in return, increases the market tightness in housing mar-
ket. Given that there are more sellers in the rental market and less sellers in 
the housing market, the rental would likely drop , and housing price would in-
crease.Hence, the valuation of buyers in the housing market would decrease, 
and that of lessee's would increase. Moreover the rent price ratio will decrease 
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and sellers' entry value would increase, with more efficient matching outcomes 
now imposed by the matching function. 
Figure B.4 is about Here 
However , the interaction of changing 'm 1 is more complicated. We already 
discussed that the changes of m 2 will bring more sellers in the rental market. 
Intuitively, this should also hold when there is an increase in m 1 , that is more 
sellers would arrive in the housing market. However, in our core equation, there 
are both positive and negative effects of m 1 on market tightness. Hence, in the 
current numerical setting, the simulation presents a counter intuition figure, 
and it fits the core equation in the housing market. Other equilibrium outcomes 
are consistent with our intuition, and the matching rate effect is dominated by 
the price effect; thus, the valuation of buyers is increasing. 
Buyers' and Lessees' Valuations In addition, we also examine the im-
pacts on equilibrium outcomes by the variation of per period utility gain from 
purchasing a housing unit, rD. ' and rent , r. 
Figure B.5 is about Here 
It is clear that the change in equilibrium outcomes in the housing market is the 
same with the long-run simulation. Furthermore, due to the fixed population, 
the rental market's equilibrium outcomes are also affected. With a higher util-
ity gain from the trade for buyers in the housing market, more sellers would 
enter the housing market. With less sellers in the rental market, the rental 
rate would increase, and the valuation of buyers decreases. Notice here, in the 
housing market, the valuation of buyers increases with the utility gain, which 
indicates that the dominant effect here is the matching rate effect. However, 
the increment of housing price will always exceed the increment of rental rate, 
and thus the rent price ratio declines, but the seller's entry value increases. 
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Figure B.6 is about Here 
If we examine the utility gain from rent, we also observe similar patterns with 
long-run simulation. The intuition behind these patterns is parallel to the last 
figure, but with opposite directions. 
Figure B. 7 is about Here 
Population Masses Finally, we turn to population mass. Notice that the 
above discussion is based on the initial population at long-run equilibrium 
value. Now, keeping all other parameters unchanged, we just vary the initial 
population of buyers and sellers to examine the short-run equilibrium impli-
cations. 
Figure B.8 is about Here 
With more buyers, B 1 , in the housing market, a larger proportion of sellers 
would enter the housing market; since other parameters are kept the same, 
we know in the equilibrium that there are equal market tightnesses in both 
submarkets. Since there is more demand in the housing market, the price would 
definitely increase, and as there are less sellers left in the rental market, rental 
rate also increases , which in sum drives down the buyer 's valuation in both 
submarkets. However, the seller's entry value would increase , but the rent price 
ratio decreases . However, if there are more lessees, B 2 , in the rental market, 
the story would almost be the same with the above scenario. Thus , we turn to 
the variation in sellers' population. 
Figure B.9 is about Here 
The increase in seller's population, S, would have an opposite effect related to 
the increase in buyers' population. 
Figure B.lO is about Here 
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We can observe that there are decreases in market tightness. Then with more 
supply, the price and rental rate decline, and buyers' valuation increases. The 
rent price ratio increases , and seller's entry value declines as well , which all 
match our expectations. 
4.4 Discussions 
The short-run equilibrium imposes the restriction on population flows, with no 
new blood into the market. With this restriction, the agents' behavior displays 
principle patterns of a competitive search framework. Although the markets 
are perfectly segmented but linked by the entry value, the equilibrium changes 
in one market would influence those in another market. In this model, the 
responses are instantaneous. It is reasonable to assume, rather than strictly 
apply equal valuation for sellers in both markets that there is a gap between 
sellers and lessors, which is driven by the inertia. With a fixed gap in valuation, 
our model is still valid unless the fluctuation of the seller's valuation creates 
enough profit to attract lessors or sellers in another market to enter. Since now, 
the existing discussion is on statics, we present the dynamics of our model in 
the next section. 
Chapter 5 
The Dynamics of the Model 
The discussion in the preceding sections was entirely about steady state anal-
ysis. This is because two submarkets are perfectly segmented, and we would 
like to investigate the dynamic interactions between the two submarkets. In 
this section, we first state the dynamic equations in the competitive search 
model, and then present an alternative method using short-run equilibria to 
approximate the transition path. Finally, we illustrate our idea by simulations 
in the last part of this section. 
5.1 Dynamic Population and Bellman Equa-
tions 
The free entry restriction imposed on sellers is 
Thus, the out-of-steady-state Bellman equations for the two submarkets are 
IT1 = (r + M1 (81)) II1 - M1 (81) P 
vl = ( r + TJl ( el)) vl + cl - T/1 ( el) ( n - T P) 
IT _ r ( r + j3 + J12 ( 82)) IT _ J12 ( 82) R 
2- r+/3 2 r+/3 
T';- - r ( r + j3 + T}2 ( e2)) T 7 ( e ) ( r - R) 
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All these value functions are obtained by adding the dynamic term to the RHS 
of Bellman equations (2.4), (2.5) , (2.6), and (2.8). The population dynamics 
are described as 
El = bl - 7Jl ( 81) El (5.5) 
B2 = b2 - TJ2 ( 82) B2 + {3N (5.6) 
N = 7]2 (82)B2- {3N (5.7) 
S =a- J-L1 (81) S1 + {3N- J-L2 (82) S2 + cP (IT- fi) (5.8) 
These population equations are exactly the same as Equations (3.1), (3.2), 
(3.3) ,and (3.4). 
5.2 Transition Path in the Dynamics 
It is natural for us to analyze the dynamics of the model directly by discretizing 
the system. Alternatively, we can adopt the following approach, which would 
be more intuitive in interpretation. Notice that we further assume the inflow 
rate of sellers as a + cP (IT - fi). When IT = fi, the inflow rate is exactly b, 
which equals b1 + b2 in the long-run equilibrium. When IT =/= fi, we have a 
short-run equilibrium seller's inflow. When one parameter changes, we assume 
that the transition dynamics is composed of a series of short-run equilibria 
which have fixed populations. Based on this assumption, we can develop the 
transition dynamics between two long-run equilibria. 
5.2.1 Temporary Shocks and Ir.opulse Responses 
We examine the impulse response for a 1% shock in all exogenously determined 
parameters in the short run. 
Bargaining Power First, we examine the impulse response for a 1% shock 
in the bargaining power of sellers in submarket 1, a 1 . We could observe that in 
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the short run, existing sellers would move toward the housing market, which 
leads to an increase in market tightness in the rental market and a decrease 
in the housing market. In this situation, both rental rate and housing price 
increase, which increases the seller's entry value. Given the seller's entry equa-
tion, we know that when the entry value is higher, more sellers would be 
attracted to enter the market. With the value of sellers booming in the first 
period, too many sellers in the economy would be attracted, which cause a 
significant decline in the second period. Therefore, this access supply of sellers 
would bring down the seller's value which lower future supply. Since this ex-
cess supply would allow matches to increase, there are less buyers and lessees 
left in the market. Also, with less supply of sellers, in period 3, the market 
tightness is reverted back. After 3 quarters, the variables converge back to the 
old equilibrium. 
Figure D .1 is about Here 
Transaction Cost Next, we turn to the parameter associated with the trans-
action cost, T . The 1% shock in transaction cost would bring the housing 
market approximately 6% temporary increase in market tightness in the first 
quarter. The reason for this response is that buyers would adjust their budget 
for purchasing. The gain from trade is less for sellers. Thus, sellers would move 
out from the housing market and enter the rental market, which leads to a 
decrease in rental market tightness. Due to this, the seller's valuation drops, 
which bring less sellers in the upcoming period. Since the shock is temporary, 
and there is a relatively strong demand in the first period, the price and rental 
rate would increase, and the sellers' value would also increase, so all these 
variables fluctuate around the equilibrium value and finally converge to the 
equilibrium. 
Figure D.10 is about Here 
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These impulse responses characterize the dynamic responses to the tem-
porary shocks by applying short-run equilibrium for approximation. We leave 
other impulse responses in the Appendix for reference. 
5.2.2 The Transition Path for Permanent Shocks 
We illustrate such transition paths by a permanent shock on parameters. We 
present the simulation results using 1% scale of permanent shock in the seller's 
bargaining powers a 1 and a 2 , separation rate (3, matching function coefficients 
ml and m2, utility gains from trade rn and r, and transaction cost T. Since 
many of these transition paths share similar patterns, we will discuss some 
to set examples. In the following simulation examples , we set the period zero 
as the original equilibrium for the a start, and a permanent shock hits the 
economy at the first period. 
First, we discuss the transition path for the 1% permanent shock in (3. It 
would be useful to preview the equilibrium results using this permanent shock. 
Table C.l is about Here 
Separation Rate When there is a shock in (3, we know in the rental market 
that there are more lessees due to the higher separation rate, and this could 
increase the market tightness. In such situation, there is a flow of sellers from 
the rental market to the housing market, with the underlining force being the 
shorter length of the rental contract due to the change in (3. This decreases 
the market tightness. Owing to the change in population mass in submarkets, 
we observe that the rental rate increases to compensate for the short length 
of the contracts, despite the fact that it is easier to locate a lessee now and 
decrease in price in the housing market with more sellers. All these changes 
would drive down the seller's valuation, which would bring less sellers in the 
next quarter. Thus, in the second period, both market tightnesses 1ncrease, 
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along with the housing price and rental rate. These would drive up the sellers' 
value and bring more sellers in the next period. Thus, after the third period, 
all variables fluctuate around the equilibrium and finally converge to the new 
equilibrium. 
Figure C.3 is about Here 
Lessees' Valuation Finally, we turn to a permanent change in utility gain 
from renting a house, r. With a higher utility gain from rent, lessees would 
have a higher reservation value in bargaining, which would benefit sellers in the 
rental market. Thus, the sellers would move into the rental market, causing 
the market tightness in the rental market to decrease , whereas the market 
tightness in the housing market now increases. Meanwhile, the lower supply in 
the housing market would drive up the housing price. Thus, we observe that 
the transaction price and rental rate both increase. Therefore, the seller 's entry 
value increases, which would bring more sellers in the next period. With these 
access sellers in the market, the market tightness declines. Thus, there are now 
more buyers left and less sellers entering, and the price and rental rate would 
drop again. After three quarters, we observe the convergence of these variables 
to the new equilibrium. 
Figure C.7 is about Here 
Chapter 6 
Further Research Directions 
There are many possible research directions as extensions to this paper. Mainly, 
there are three approaches that could be implemented in our model. The first is 
a discussion of the tenure choice problem in the model. The second is breaking 
the market segmentation assumption to assume different market accessabilities 
for agents in the economy. The last one is breaking down the matching function 
approach and adopting and matching mechanism based on micro foundation. 
We will discuss all these in detail in the following subsections. 
6.1 Tenure Choice in the Model 
Tenure choice is the core problem in rent housing market interactions. Here, 
our model only assumes heterogenous buyers in the submarket, thus avoiding 
dealing with this problem. There are ways to implement the existing model. 
Endogenous Tenure Choice We consider that the heterogeneity in buyers 
is now continuous in their wealth or labor income, and which market to enter 
is a choice variable for them. Regarding their wealth, the buyers would split 
into two groups and enter different submarkets. 
Exogenous Tenure Choice We could model the inflow of buyers in sub-
market 1 to come directly from the buyers in submarket 2 at a exogenous rate. 
47 
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Thus, the flow chart changes into 
Sellers ' Inflow 
Exit the Market 
Buyers' Inflow Lessees ' Inflow 
Figure 6.1: The Flow Chart of the Modified Search Model 
This approach has the advantage that we do not need to assume the inflow 
of lessees to be zero in order to control the size of rental pairs. In the equilib-
rium, if the number of lessees ' change to buyers equals the number of lessees ' 
inflow, the rental pair can still be maintained at a constant to facilitate the 
analysis. 
6.2 Market Accessability 
In the data, we also find that there is a certain number of sellers who mark 
their housing units both for sale and rent. In the existing model , the seller can 
only meet one type of buyer after he/she chooses the submarket to enter. To 
implement this, we could introduce a parameter a to capture the accessability 
of sellers in one submarket to another. Now, the sellers' Bellman Equation 
Chapter 6 Further Research Directions 
changes to 
r II1 = 111 (P- Ill) + 6112 ( ~ - II2) 
r rr 2 = 112 ( ~ - rr 2) + 6111 ( P - rr 1) 
and we could follow the routine procedure to analyze the model. 
6.3 The 'Mismatch' Approach 
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Originating from Lucas & Prescott (1974) and recently introduced by Shimer 
(2007) , Mortensen (n.d.), Lagos (2000) ,and Caplin & Leahy (2008), a new 
modeling framework is proposed to analyze job vacancy and unemployment 
dynamics, with more emphasis on cyclical behaviors and distributions. This 
approach is complementary rather than a substitute to our model framework, 
since the matching function approach generally discusses the economic be-
havior in the equilibrium. In addition, the non-matching funct ion approach 
also provides a computational and calibration tool to analyze the model. We 
present an analogy of the mismatch model in the Appendix. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we document the interactions between the housing and rent 
markets, with two emphasized ratios: the rent-price ratio and the vacancy 
rate ratio of the two markets. Our competitive search model can explain the 
comovement of these two ratios, and the empirical evidences are provided. The 
results can be summarized as follows: when the market tightness is high, with 
less vacant housing units on the market, the price would increase and vice 
versa. 
Moreover, we also define the long-run and short-run search equilibrium and 
investigate the comparative statics . With further assumptions on the functional 
form of the matching function and parameters value, we obtain a numerical 
simulation result on the comparative statics and explain the assumption be-
hind, which is based on the competitive search framework. 
In addition to the above work, we also investigate the dynamic properties 
of the model. We define the transitional path between two long-run search 
equilibria using short-run search equilibria. We also simulate the impulse re-
sponse of the model outcomes on the exogenous variables. Our results provide 
good approximations and explanation on various shocks in real life. 
Furthermore, we also discuss many possible research extensions for a bet-
ter understanding of the housing market dynamics. Deviating from what we 
50 
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discussed in the ma1n context, there are many more potential research ex-
tensions that could be made. We could further incorporate welfare as defined 
by Diamond ( 1980) in the search model to capture the welfare changes in all 
these simulations for further policy analysis. Also, we only discuss one specific 
matching function in this paper; if we adopt the matching function in Cobb-
Douglas form , we may be able to further discuss the search efficiency defined 
by Hosios (1990). 
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Appendix A 
Simulation on Long-run 
Equilibrium 
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Simulation on Short-run 
Equilibrium 
Market Tightness to Change of o 1 
' -5 r-----.---.---..----i======;-: '.5 
I - Rental Market I ·· Housing Marl<et I 
I · 
'' ; ; L_ _ _ o _~45 __ __.o_-5 ---o.~55 __ __.o_-6 ---0.~65,---- --o' . t t;
-- ~ --j {~ -·. 
0.45 0.5 0.55 0 .6 0.65 0.7 
Flow Prob. of Selling to Change of o.1 
0.45 0.5 0.55 
Time on the market to Change of a:1 
e . 5~--.,-----.----.----,I=:_=_=_=:::Re=n"'ta==l M=a=rl<=.,=i(• 
·· ·· ·· Housing Market I 
... 
;· •-; '----o.~45---o--'-. 5,-----o.~55 ___ o__._6 __ o_6'-=5---o·" __ i' 
Y. -: (Is Price and Rent to Change of a.1 
,_, r--.-----,-----r---';:::======;- :• ,~~-:, 
1.G5 
1-- Rental Market ~ 
_I ·· Housing Market 1· : :i5t~ 
O.!:Li 
'' · 9 L---o.~45,-----o--'-. 5,-----o.'::-:55,-----o--'-.6,-----o.~65,-----o'. ~ -;~r 
Rent-Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to Change of a 1 
<l.nt :- c1--.------.---~--?===r:======i"1 
! 
............ Seller Entry Value I . 
0.01 :(1 
... ---······ 
(J.0 12'5 . 
- - - Rent- Price Ratio J: !: :X~ 
: ~ 
··) 
'J.O i l ·' '-- -o.~45 ___ o__._5 __ o .~55 ___ o__._6 __ o _~65---'-"o',' .. :7., '• 
Flow Prob. of Buying to Change of a.1 
I ·_···_·_····_·_· ~~:~~~~~~~~ell 




G.3 '----..__ __ ...._ _ _._ __ ~ _ __ ..__ __ , G.4 
o:i 0.45 
0 .45 
0.5 0.55 0.6 0 .65 
Time to buy to Change of c:x1 
0.5 0.55 
1--Rental Market I 
... ~· 1 ·· ·· ·· Housing Market I 
s; 
0.6 0.65 o.i 
Figure B.l: The change of a 1 on Short Run Equilibrium 
60 
Market Tightness to Change of o:2 
r---~---,---~-------..====::;-! ; '; 
1 
.. ········· Rental Market I 
-· -- -- Housing Market I 
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 o.i 
Valuation of Buyers to Change of o2 
r---~-~-~-~======~,~ 
I Rental Market I _ : · Housing Market J 
' 
- ·· ... 
0 .5 0 .55 0.6 0.65 o.7· 
Flow Prob. of Sel ling to Change of CY2 
r---~----~--~----~==~==~! ' 
1
-- Rental Market I 
Housing Market f' 
.. -- -- ··· .. 
0.5 0 .55 0.6 0.65 o.i 
Time on the market to Change of n2 
~ ') 
L-----~----~----~----~~----~----; 1 
0.5 0 .55 0.6 0.65 0.7 
Price and Rent to Change of a2. < -: o" 
'! :, r-=----,.----,.----,.-------,=:::::::::::::::======;-j/.<);>0 
1 
.... ....... Renta l Market I 
-- Housing Market I 
..... ····· 
G.<; '-------0 ...... 45--------'0.-5 -----0 ...... 55----~0.~6 -----0-'-.6-5 ----o-'.7 ' ''·c~c~ 
Flow Prob. of Buying to Change of ct2 
0.45 0.5 0.55 
Time to buy to Change of n2 
; (• r---~-,..-----.----r====:==::;-';•~ 
I ·· .... Rental Market J 
__ J -- Housing Market J·! -: 
7. 
0.45 0.5 0.55 0 .6 0 .65 
Figure B.2: The change of a 2 on Short Run Equilibrium 
Market Tightness to Change of I\ 
1 · 
X t~ ' 
.s . ~i~ r'--~--~----~---,-----..--,==:::=?===;:;: 
.C .79 · 
4 -; ~~ ~J -
4 . ~·~ . 
4 7 ~' 5 ............ _ 
~ .-u . 
.! .:-'U ~ 
!'!f) 
.p;.;c,-
.~ ;·;,; '-----'---~----~--~----~--~----'-----• n.B 
0. 11 5 0.12 0 .125 0. 13 0. 135 
Flow Prob. of Selling to Change of U 
,, 4,--~--~----~---,-----..--,======~;t 
I 
.......... Rental Market I 
..... .. .. Housing Mari<et 1· r; 
r; 
O.Tt r; 
0 3 6 
'-----,-o ...... 11-=-5---=-o ...... 12::--o::-. 1.._2-=-5 ---=-o.~13----=o-. 1~35::--o~. 1--:4----:o~. 14--:5----:-o.'1 's' 
Time on the market to Change of U 
g s,--~--~----~---r----rr=~:::=~==::;-1'' 
1 
...... - Rental Marl<el I 
........ Housing Market! 
.,_:, L----'---~----~---'-----'----~------'-----' l' 
0.115 0.12 0 .125 o.13 o.135 o.14 0 .145 o. (5 
Price and Rent to Change of U 
1 · . .. 
u . ~~R '------'----~----~---'-----'-----'-------'------'"' ~ :::;c, 
0.115 0 .12 0.125 0.13 0.135 
Rent- Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to Change of 11 
.... _ 
c (I ~ 2 ~ ~.5 
0.115 0.12 0 .125 0.13 0.135 0.14 0.145 0.15 






0.115 0 .12 0 .125 0.13 0.135 
Time to buy to Change of r1 
~ .. 
'1 .8 - ~ l~.~J 
'! .6 €' 
0.115 0.12 0 .125 0.13 0.135 0 .14 0.145 0.15 
Figure B.3: The change of f3 on Short Run Equilibrium 
61 
Market Tightness to Change of m2 ~ ~ 0'; Price and Rent to Change of m2 
1.(;:_, ;X'- 1.1;:/ ;;;,•c. [ . ········· Rent~l Market t ]. 
· Hous1ng Market 1.1;1 
, .. ··· ······ Renta l Market J 




- 0 . ~ -~ 
-
, ,c,~ 
a_r,:.:; o . ~x ; _::.,, 
0 .84 0.86 0 .88 0 .9 0 .92 0 .94 0.96 0.98 0.84 0.86 0 .88 0 .9 0.92 0 .94 0 .96 0.98 
x 1C 
~ ~ o.u; ., 
4 .'? ~~ . (J 01 ~\ ~, • 
.! "}(; f;; t) '!3 
.!"!'! 0 . 1JL:~ 
:'. ?5 0 0 ~2 
0 .84 0 .86 0 .88 0 .9 0 .92 0 .94 0 .96 0.98 0.84 0.86 0.88 0 .9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 




G ~ t:5 · 
~ -- Rental Market 
1 
1: 
Housing Market {;. ~ 0 "3C5 :. ~ -- Renta l Market tl · Housing Market ! ~ :." 
(1 :;a 0.5 O.J!J 
"·5 
l':. ~) ~· :.J (; G. ~i7i..l 
" 
n.:{i O.Tl 
0.84 0 .86 0 .88 0 .9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.84 0.86 0.88 0 .9 0.92 0 .94 0 .96 0.98 




········ Rental Market t 1-
·· -- Housing Market 7 .!"6 I 
.~ 
············ Rental Market 
1 
1-




7 -~ ..... , 7·:1 - ., 





' 0.84 0.86 0 .88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 0 .84 0.86 0.88 0 .9 0.92 0 .94 0 .96 0.98 
Figure B.4: The change of m 2 on Short Run Equilibrium 
Market Tightness to Change of m 1 
; .;r--~~-~-~~-;===::==::::; !'' 
I Rental Marl<et I. ~. 
, ,1_-_ 
1· 
Housing Market I 
'.I 
(' .6 .____. __ __._ _ ..__ _ _._ __ _.__ _ __._ _ _,__ ___ •<'.5 
0.7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.8 0 .82 
0.7 0.72 0.74 
Flow Pro b. of Selling to Change of m 1 
-.; :.; , --,-----.----..----r---r-;===:=====;-: ~ 4~\ 
L-_.:..:.=.::=.:.e-=,:= i r; ~ -! 
~f; .H:. 
0 _;, L___. __ _._ __ ..__ _ _._ __ ..__ _ _._ __ ...._--'' I).;., 
0.7 0.72 0.74 0 .76 0.78 0.8 0.82 
Time on the market to Change of m1 
~'' 1___,---.,..--~--~--..-r==>::::::===:;]'' 
1
-- Rental Market I 
.. ··· ·· ~ousing Market}. 
0.7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.8 0 .82 
:-c: ~a" Price and Rent to Change of m1 
'.C' ' r~--.--...----..---.,-r==.::::::======; !', ::.-· ::··- l Rental Market I 
.. . . .. __ Housing Market J 
0 r:~ 
0 .7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.8 0.82 
n.uL:s 
0 012'! 
0 1) 125 
0.0125 · '~.B5 
u 0 12.4 L____. __ _._ __ ..__ _ _._ __ _.__ _ __._ _ _ _,___; (;.9 
0.7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.8 0.82 
Flow Prob. of Buying to Change of m1 
{;_ ;, 




0 .7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.8 0.82 
Time to buy to Change of m1 
<; 
0.7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.8 0.82 
Figure B.5: The change of m 1 on Short Run Equilibrium 
62 
Marl<et Tightness to Change of r1J: 
c 5 ; ,) : 
5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 
L-:-::'-----:--'----:cc'-----:-,......_---:-.__--'-----:--'----:-::'~-:-:':-----:--':-:---:-::'~j G.;J 
5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 
Flow Prob. of Selling to Change of rO 
........... 
0.2 :3 · 
~ . . . : 
a.:;;; L-::-c'-----:--'------:-:'-----:-,......_---:-.__--'- -'----:-::'~-:-':-----:--':-:---:-::'--,---,-, ; t; ·! 
5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 
Time on the market to Change of rO 
s c;,_----,--~--,--~--,--~--,------..======~ 
~ :) :;. 
--.... ·-·- .. 
. .. ~ 
., ~} "---'--'----'----'---'--~~-:-':---':-:-~-:-::'---'----:cc'- L:_ 
5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 
Price and Ren t to Change of rU 
1 . f;~i 
C.'~' j :.::00 
5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 
Rent- Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to Change of rO 
O.OL!r · 
n °1 " 4 L-5=-='5o-o----:-:56-':-oo----:-57:':o-o --:5-'8o_o_5_9._oo-6o.._oo_6_,_1 o_o_6_.2o_o_6_3-':-oo_64_._o_o _6_..5o_o_6~rfo'l 
Flow Prob. of Buying to Change of rO ~ 
GA ~~---,--.-------,---r--.--~~==::=====~-G-5 
O.JU · 
o . :~u 
~ . 
.!(;A :.) 
5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6~~b ~ 
Time to buy to Change of rO 
..~ .. .. . . .. .. ... 
., .~J .___..___.____.._ _ _.___~_._--':-:-~-:-::'---'---:cc'--· j ~~ 
5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6 100 6200 6300 6400 6500 6600 
Figure B .6: The change of rD + c1 on Short Run Equilibrium 
Marl<et T ightness to Change of r 
'""-'I -,.------,--.---.---~~-r;:::::===~·,,' ".> 
I ··· Rent~l Market I · Hous1ng Mari<etl 
.. ' 
'' -~' L-2 3-':-00:--2--:3':c50----:-2-'4-00----:-2-'45--:0----:-2-'-50--:-0 ----:-2:':55--:0 -26-'--0-0 - 26.._50- 2--::7-':-00_ 2_7._50--' '·'---~-' 
.: a . 
- ~ 75 . 
,, .i" '---'-----'::----'------:--:'------:.__~,---'-----'- ~~~' ''-3 
2300 2350 2400 2450 2500 2550 
Flow Prob. of Sell ing to Change of r 
:; 41 ,------,-----,-----r----.-----,---"'";======:::;-!t 
I 
........... Rental Marl<et 
.. .. .. Housing Marl<el 
o.:~~ I; 
0. 36 
2300 2350 2400 2450 2500 2550 2600 2650 2700 2750 
Time on the mali<:et to Change of r 
3 5 ,-; 
~ ----- -- Rental Marl<et 
..... 
· Housing Marl<et 
·: ..... ~·.:· · 
'''· 
'! .~) 
2300 2350 2400 2450 2500 2550 2600 2650 2700 2750 
Price and Rent to Change of r x ~c .. ' 
u:.,.--~----,------r----.-- --,---"'";======:;; ·,,. 
I 
Rental Market I 
.. L_ __ H.:..:ou'-=-si_,ng,___M--"a-rke:.;_;t / 
o.!>:, c:_.__~~--:-::'----':----'----'::---'----'--:-::'- --':-- ' ~ r,,,~, 
2300 2350 24 00 2450 2500 2550 2600 2650 2700 2750 
() 
0 
L:o I ,----,,-Re_n_t- -,Pr_ic_e r_•t..,.io_a_nd_S,el_le_r E_n--,-try_v_alrueit=o C=h=ani:g=e =of=r==c:::;-;'~ 
1 
............. Seller E~try Value! 
n 01-:.1 
- - - Rent- Pnce Ratio I· ~ 
O.t)125 
U.<l124 L_.__--:-::'~~----'---:cc'----'----'--~-:-::'--:-::'-- ';; ~ 
2300 2350 2400 2450 2500 2550 2600 2650 2700 2750 
Flow Prob. of Buying to Change of r 
~;.4 t::'.--~----,------,-----,----,----r;=:=====:;-!'' ,; 
I .......... Rental Market I. . .. .. Housing Market I 
' ; 
O.J•' L-23-':-00:--2:-:3-':-50:--2~4'-00----:-2-'45:c:0----:-2-:'50--:-0---::-2--!:55c::-0---::-26:':0-:-0 ~26-'-::50-:--2:-::7~00=--2~750~ "; 
Time to buy to Change of r 
~-s i.-----.---,---,----,------.----.-;:=====~<; 
1
·------ Rental Market I 
.. ... ·· Housing Market I 
., .:, L 2_3._00_ 2_._35-,--0 24~00----:2~45c::-0 ----::-:25.L..00:--:2-:'55c::-O ----::-:26':-00:--:2-:'65::-::-0--::-:27':-00::---:2~7 5--:0-' !' 
Figure B.7: The change of r + c2 on Short Run Equilibrium 
63 
U)5r <_ '' o..--' -.----.-P-r-rlce_a_n_d ..-Re_n_t o~C~h-an_g-,.e _ofrB=1 ======:::;-! '"')Q 
1 
.. ····· · · · · Rental Market 1-
.. Housing Market t · 
-·- .. -· · ·-
2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2.7 2.75 2.8 2.85 
Rent- Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to Change of B 1 
'J. ot2J:SI.------.---,----,.--~--.---r;= =====::;- ' 
__ _ .J --------~ S el ler E~try Value I 
-I ·- ·· ··· Rent-Pnce Ratio J 
D.OL'5 
0 .01 24 '--'------'---'----'---L---'---'--"------''----'---' " 
2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2. 7 2.75 2.8 2.85 
Flow Prob. of Buying to Change of B 1 




o.:;;; '--'------'-,---'----'---L-- -'-- -'--"------'---'---' ,,4~ 
2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2.7 2.75 2.8 2.85 
Time to buy to Change of 81 
g_ ;;~--,--~--.----.--~-~;:====:====;-
1 
········ Rental Market I 
··· · -- Housing M arket] 
···--················ 
"I .;, '--'------':::---'-:---:-':-:---L-- -':-::---'--L.,-----'---'--,---' ,, 
2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2.7 2.75 2.8 2.85 
Figure B.8: The change of B1 on Short Run Equilibrium 
Market Tightness to Change of 8 2 
1.f;:5-'f ~-~-~--.---,---,--r==:='=::==j]: - ~r~ 
l: .......... Rental Market I · ... ··· ··· Housing Market ] 
G.!' :, "'-'-·-· ----''------'-----'---'----'----'----'----'----'--·; '' 
2.25 2.3 2.35 2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2.7 
Flow Prob. of Selling to Change of 8 2 
--~ -- .... -----·-::.: 
.. _ =~-- :: 
O . :J;, '-'---~--'--~-~-~-~-~-~-'-----'1) 
2 .25 2.3 2.35 2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2.7 
Time on the market to Change of 8 2 
g,s ~----,-----.-----r--~---..----rr==c=:==c==~~1' 
1
····-.. --. Rental Market I 
·· ··· ·· Housing Mari<et I 
.,_~) '-'---'--~--'--~-~-~-~-~-'---'c 
2.25 2.3 2.35 2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2.7 
I.05T..-j~--r--~--P-r~ice_a_nd~R~e-nt_lo~C~h-an_g~eo_frB2~~====~ ;;' 
I. ··--·- Rental Market J . ·· Housing M arket)· 
1 · 
0~ ! 
2.25 2.3 2.35 2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2.7 
Rent- Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to Change of 8 2 
(} (1~3 ~--,.---,.----.---.--~-t===:==::===ti 
1 
............. Seller Entry Value ) 
- - - R ent- Price Ratio J 
•• r•" 
G 0'2 
"' 2.25 2.3 2.35 2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2.7 
Flow Prob. of Buying to Change of 8 2 
D.4 
n.:;> 
n .~~~ :: · :: ·: . ......... -~---
o.:-rl 
03•'· 
2.25 2.3 2.35 2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2.7 
Time to buy to Change of 8 2 
3.5 ,., 
~ ----· Rental Mari<et 
1 
I 
·· ··· ·· Hou~~~g Market 
''-~· 
., - ~) 
2.25 2.3 2.35 2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55 2.6 2.65 2.7 
Figure B.9: The change of B 2 on Short Run Equilibrium 
64 
Market Tightness to Change of S x ;o~· Price and Renl to Change of S 
~ .5 j ~ . 1 
1-
Rental Market tl 
·· Housing Market 1 G5 
1 : 




4.7 4 .8 4.9 5 .1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5 .5 5.6 4.7 4 .8 4 .9 5 .1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5 .5 5.6 
~ : o::. 
•: ~ Q,O'I:.!il 
4. B:.i :.l .OITi 
~ ~. 0 .01/.f.i 
4 .1=) 
·:··.::··: 
:. --.:::·· .. : 0 .012'S ... . .. 
... 
--
~ :; ·:; ~~ 
.. 
47 (1 . 01/.-~ ;;;·:; 
4 .7 4 .8 4 .9 5 .1 4 .7 4 .8 4 .9 5 .1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5 .5 5.6 
Flow Prob. of Sell ing to Change of S Flow Prob. of Buying to Change of S 
0 -~ ~ .~ ~ 0. -~ 
·-
... ,J Rental Market ,j· .. . .. Housing Market 
!L~B · ~ t~ . - 0 .:~ 1':1 
.. 
:c'A 
(1 . ~~5 :c. . .;:; (l ~!f) 
4.7 4 .8 4 .9 5 .1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5 .5 5.6 4 .7 4 .8 4 .9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5 .5 5 .6 
Time on the market to Change of S Time to buy to Change of S 
8.:1 ::' fL5 I - Rental Market t,. 
-- -- ··· Housing Market 
~ -- Rental Market 
1
1 











;·:.;·- .. :' .b 
4.7 4 .8 4 .9 5 .1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5 .5 5.6 4.7 4 .8 4 .9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5 .6 





Transition Path of Market Tightness to a 1% Permanent Shock ona1 
1 ' 
/ 
~:u~gL_ _ __._ _ ~--~--~-__._--~---' •' · 
0 
4 .'1.' L_ _ __._ _ _.__ _ -'-_-~ _ __._ _ _.__ ___ , ,) 
0 
on Permanent 
Transition Path of Price and Rent to a 1% Permanent Shock ona1 
~ gp;; L_ _ __._ _ ~---'---~-~--~---' 
0 
Transition Path of of Rent- Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to 1% Permanent Shock...on~1 
o.n1.t:u ·'~ ·n 
0 .012'6 





.i ~= . _.., 
fJ .012:::..0L_ _ _L __ ~--~--~--:---~--~~~ ~:.. 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































o m .. ~~-· · 





0.!<9 '-----"---'-----'-----'----'-------'---- ' I;• 9} 
0 
Y. :d' Transition Path of Price and Rent to a 1% Permanent Shock ona2 
10Gn~--;---r--~--~-~~==~====~ 
1.00-~ . 
Transition Path of of Rent-Price ratio and Seller Entry Va lue to 1% Permanent Shockxon_c;t2 
r') 0 1 ~: 5 ~-5 
0 .0126. 
0.012i..i . 
.. ••• •• •• •• •• •• •• .•• •• :: ' : ·; l~ 
······································ 0.01::':5 :n.:<· 
0.012ti-
0 .0 1LU0:'----'----:-----:-----'-----'-----'---~'s ·; 
Figure C.2: Transition Path to 1% Permanent Shock on a 2 
Transitton Path of Market Tightness to a 1% Pem1anent Shock onfi 
1 ou;,1-~---r--~--~----;==========;-; ·" ' 
1 
.... ······ Rental Market I 
·· Housing Market I 
/I 






x 1 ~:Sfransition Path of Valuation of Buyers to a 1 o;.,  Permanent Shock o~ '( --: 0·: 
uru ,~ 
4. n 5 · 
.4 . 7 ~'!.. l·, ·; 
A.77?. .__ _ __.. __ _,_ __ _,_ __ ,__ _ __.. _ _ _,_ _ _ j ;s c~ 
0 7 
/. : (!:; T ransition Path of Price and Rent to a 1% Permanent Shock on ~ 
~ OG1 
()989 / .. 
0 1 
Transition Path of of Rent-Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to 1% Permanent Shoe~ onl3 
0 t)1:i5 -<·,:~) 
___ ... --··· 
- .. : ·s ·;; 
0 .01260'-----'-----'-----'----'-----'-----'----~ J !J 
Figure C.3: Transition Path to 1% Permanent Shock on f3 
68 
Transition Path of Market Tightness to a 1% Permanent Shock on m1 
1 Gl 
.. ~· .~· ..... . 




4 775 .. / 
/ 
/ 
4. Ti 0'-------'----..__ _ __.__ _ ...___----'----'-----~·· 
9.!1t.i '--------'----'----'----'----'-- ----'---- ' :..?~~f: 
0 
Transiti on Path of of Rent- Price rat io and Seller Entry Value to 1% Permanent Shock,p~tn1 
0 fJL~5 r:.r:~ 
0 1) 125 ' ·· 
u 1)1£i..i . 
.,. 
o.o ! L~; 0'------'----'----'----'-----'----'---~-~ ·; 
Figure C.4: Transition Path to 1% Permanent Shock on m 1 
Transition Path of Market T1ghtness to a 1% Permanent Shock on m2 
<.Q01 . , . ,, 
4.1i'i..i· 
4 .'1 7t. 
/ 
/ 
4 .77;. 0'---------'- -~---'----'---~----'---·~·l 
L W;\ '-. 
0.989 '---------'---~---'----'--------'---~-- ·' 
0 
Transition Path of of Rent-Price ratio and Seller Entry Va lue to 1% Permanent Shock,o~fh2 
0 .0125 . ~ = .'~·' 
U.('l l£i..i \ 
~1.0 I Lti / 
o . o tztt0'-----'-----'----'---~'---~----'---~J !~ 
Figure C.5: Transition Path to 1% Permanent Shock on m 2 
69 
Transition Path of Market Tightness to a 1% Permanent Shock on Cl 
1.G2~-~--~--~--~~;::========ii' ; 
1
-- Rental Market I 
-- -- -- Housing Market I 
I · 
n. r< '.'o'-----'----'-----'----~----'---'----i' I; 
~ - ~~ >: 1::;rransition Path of Valuation of Buyers to a 1% Permanent Shock on n ~~t~ 




''·" . :' ""'/ 
4 . ~'ij '------'---'-----'-----..__ _ ___.. __ _._ ___ O<, 
0 7 




Transi tion Path of of Rent- Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to 1% Pem1anent ShocJscDft)tl 
n fJ1 ~; 5 r..B 
-----······::···::···::···::··::···::··: 
t.l.Ot ;<~; '-----'----'-----'----~----'-----"----i ·~ 'i 
0 7 
Figure C.6: Transition Path to 1% Permanent Shock on r0+c1 
Transition Path of Market Tightness to a 1% Permanent Shock onr 
'0' "1-~--~--~--,.---;=====:=::::;- : ' .0) 
I 
.......... Rent~l Market I 
1 Gl 









L----'----'----"---'-----'----'---· ' G 
x 1 ~;Sfransition Path of Valuation of Buyers to a 1% Permanent Shock onr --< "!O-: 
·~ 0 
1
-- Rental Market 
-- -- -- Housing Market 
4 .T i ,, 
~ .71'. ,5 .. ' ---'-----'----~----'----'------'---- ' '! 
0 
/. : 0s Transition Path of Price and Rent to a 1% Permanent Shock on r 
' !Jcu 1 ----,----,---.---,.-----;=======;-: 
'(1()4 
Transition Path of of Rent-Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to 1% Permanent Shoe~ cmF· 
o 01 :~o · H.:.> 
(1.0126 
0.0125 
Figure C.7: Transition Path to 1% Permanent Shock on r + c2 
70 
Transition Path of Mari<et Tightness to a 1% Permanent Shock ont 
G . o 0'-----'---~---'---~-~--~---' a.:J 
4 . 7~. 
~----··. .. 
!. ."! 40'-----'----'-----'---'-------'----'---- ' 11.1\ 
Transition Path of of Rent-Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to 1% Permanent Shock qrrt 
0 . 01 2 ~. ,;~ -~.j 
0 .01'.!.7 
:}012 1 · 
O.O ILG 
/ ' 
/ .: !:.7 
:'J tJ 1 :::n'---'---~---'---~-~--~--isA 
0 7 





% Deviation of Market T ightness to 1% Temporary Shock ona1 
0 · 
···· -- .. .. . _ 
- \ '------~----~----~----~~----~----- ' ·· 
0 
% Deviation of Valuation of Buyers to 1% Temporary Shock ono:1 
(<.:<,-----.-------..-----.- - 1 =====:::;-;r.'.o" 
1 
............ Rent~l Market I 





-a.r,;; L-____ _,__ ____ _._ ____ __,_ ____ _. ______ ..__ ___ , ,J.~ 
0 






-nt '-------'-------'--------'------'------~----- ' ·· ,)·l 
0 
% Deviation of Rent- Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to 1% Temporary Shock ona1 
{;.? r-----.----.- ~---;:::r== ==0 0,:, 
1
······· -- ·-·- Seller Entry Value! 




'/, ...... .. 
Figure D .1: Impulse Response for 1% Temporary Shock on a 1 
~0 
(;2 · 
% Deviation of Marke t Tightness to 1% Temporary Shock ona.2 
I 
---·---··· Rental Market I 
Housing Mar1<et I 
% Deviation of Valuation of Buyers to 1% Temporary Shock OIY12 
~. , ____ ....... -~---- .. .. 
6 
% Deviat ion of Price and Rent to 1% Temporary Shock on a2 
·· 1 '-------'-------'--------'------'------~-----L. 
0 
% Deviation of Rent-Pnce ratio and Seller Entry Va lue to 1% Temporary Shock ona2 
0.2,---.--~--~--?=====::::;-! (!.5 
G. I · 
· · Q 1 '------~----~----~------'-------'------ ' ·· 
0 







·· O. l:2 
·· O.UJ · 





% Deviation of Valuation of Buyers to 1% Temporary Shock on B 1 
- Q.(;4 '-----'----'-------'-----'----'---' , • . . 
0 
a. 




-n2 '-----'----'-------'----'~---'---- ' - 0 
0 
% Deviation of Rent- Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to 1% Temporary Shock on B 1 
OM ~ 
·, 
0 · ; ' .: ~! 
- n.r;:; '-----'----'-------'----'~---'---i .. :,:; :': 
0 
Figure D.3: Impulse Response for 1% Temporary Shock on B 1 
% Deviat ion of Market Tightness to 1% Temporary Shock on 8 2 




- 0.!; 1 
-O.f; ! 1 
% Deviation of Price and Rent to 1% Temporary Shock on 8 2 
%, Deviation of Rent-Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to 1% Temporary Shock on 8 2 
O.G5 ·G.:.? 
.. O.t=':l '-----'----'-------'----'----'--- -:~• /. 
0 
Figure D.4: Impulse Response for 1% Temporary Shock on B2 
74 
% Deviation of Market Tigh tness to 1% Temporary Shock on m 1 % Deviation of Price and Rent to 1% Temporary Shock on m 1 
/' 
D · U· 
-1 ~----~----~----~----~~----~----- ' ·· 0 
_ , 0~----~----~----~----~~----~-----' -0 
% Deviation of Valuation of Buyers to 1% Temporary Shock on m1 
a 1 . 
0 .1;5 . 
··O.G5 · 
··G . 1 · 
·· 0. :5 . 
- 'U 0~-----'-------i------'-------':--------':------ ' - r:.1 0~-----'-----~----~----~~-----'-------• .. ,,) ~ 
Figure D.5: Impulse Response for 1% Temporary Shock on m 1 
% Deviation of Marke t Tightness to 1% Temporary Shock on m2 
G .:O~--,----.---~-r===::=::==1! G.5'' 
l ............ Rent~l Market I Hou s1ng Market J 
.. G 5 0~----~-----i-------'-------'------~-----6' .. (.•.5 
% Deviation of Valuation of Buyers to 1% Temporary Shock on m2 
O.Gb ~----~----~----~------;==:::====~! eA 




% Deviation of Price and Rent to 1% Temporary Shock on m2 
0/o Deviation of Rent-Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to 1% Temporary Shock on m2 
0. < ·G.:/ 
. . . ........................ ·····; ~; 
Figure D.6: Impulse Response for 1% Temporary Shock on m 2 
75 
% Deviation of Market Tightness to P.4 Temporary Shock on 0 
1
-- Rental Market J 
·· ·· ·· Housing Mali<. et I 
.-
-< 0'------~----~----~------~----~-----6'·· 
% Deviation of Valuation of Buyers to 1% Temporary Shock on t1 
(;.5 . 
0. 
% Deviation of Price and Rent to 1% Temporary Shock on {l 
,---~----~--~----~==~==~:' 
1
-- Rental Market J 
·· ·· ··· Housing Market 
/, 
- 1 0'------~----~----~------~----~-----6'-1 




-- 0.1 ·: 
- D.2 '------~----~----~------'-------'-------' 
0 
Figure D . 7: Impulse Response for 1% Temporary Shock on rfl + c1 




% Deviation of Valuat ion of Buyers to 1% Temporary Shock onr 
a.:;r--~-~---,------;====:;-:' 
I-- Rental Market I ·· ·· ·· Housing Mali<et I 




%Deviation of Price and Rent to 1°.4 Temporary Shock onr 
/ 
~' 
.. , '-------'------~----~----~------~-----' --
0 
% Deviation of Rent-Price ratio and Seller Entry Value to 1% Temporary Shock onr 
a.<~-~--~--~-7==:=====:;-::'" 
':.1· 
--Q 1 '-----~----~----~----~------:------' --
0 
Figure D. 8: Impulse Response for 1% Temporary Shock on r + C2 
76 
2· 
"oL --~---'------'-------'------'----' '' O'-----'-----'------'----'-----'-----' 'J 
0 




----~ . ' / 
/ 
·-·· .... -- ~ - -. 
'-----'-------'------'----'-----'------; ,, 
Figure D.9: Impulse Response for 1% Temporary Shock on S 
% Deviation of Market T ightness to 1% Temporary Shock a nt 
-- : (1 '-------'------~--~--~---~---' -· 
0 
% Devia tion of Va luation of Buyers to 1% Temporary Shock ant 
G .~ ... 
··1 '-----'--------'----~--~---'-----·' ···' 
0 
% Deviat ion of Price and Rent to 1% Temporary Shock on t 
I ·_·  ········· Rental Market I ·· Housing Market I 
·5 '------'--------'---~--~---'------' ·5 
0 
··J . eo o'----'-----'--~----'-----'----'- ·-' 
Figure D.10: Impulse Response for 1% Temporary Shock on T 
77 
CUHK Libraries 
11 I 
004660183 
